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Abstract. We discuss the methods of Evans and Moshonov [Bayesian
Analysis 1 (2006) 893–914, Bayesian Statistics and Its Applications
(2007) 145–159] concerning checking for prior-data conflict and their
relevance to the method proposed in this paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This is an interesting paper dealing with an im-
portant topic. It is a logical continuation of the con-
tributions found in Bayarri and Berger (2000). In
particular, it continues the emphasis on avoiding the
“double use of the data” and this is an important
point that we agree with.
While it seems intuitively clear what “double use
of the data” means, it would be nice to have a pre-
cise definition as the phrase seems to be used a bit
too freely by some at times, at least in our view. In-
tuitively, in model checking, this would seem to be
the situation where the fitted model depends on a
particular aspect of the data and then the model is
checked by comparing the same aspect of the data
with the fitted model. On the other hand, we have
seen assertions that a “double use of the data” is
being made in situations like computing a posterior
(the first use) and then (the second use) comput-
ing a characteristic of that distribution like a mode
or hpd region. While in some technical sense this
seems like using the data twice, there does not seem
to be anything wrong with it, at least to us. Rather
than giving a definition, this paper, like Bayarri and
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Berger (2000) and Robins, van der Vaart and Ven-
tura (2000), points to a negative consequence of dou-
ble use of the data, in terms of the lack of unifor-
mity of p-values. Perhaps the factorization in Sec-
tion 2 of this discussion gives a general method of
ensuring that components of the total information
available to a statistician for an analysis are used ap-
propriately, and so gives a general characterization
for avoidance of “double use of the information.”
This paper assumes a default or “objective” prior
on the last level of a hierarchically specified prior.
In general this will result in an improper prior. Part
of the motivation for this seems to be that “model
checking with informative priors cannot separate in-
adequacy of the prior from inadequacy of the model”
and so the methodology proposed by Box (1980),
which is based on proper priors, is not used. We
disagree with the quoted statement. The methods
discussed in Evans and Moshonov (2006, 2007) are
a modification of Box’s approach and are motivated
precisely by the need to separate the two kinds of
inadequacies in the context of proper, informative
priors which, as they should, represent subjective
beliefs. We briefly outline this approach in Section 2.
Also, Evans and Moshonov (2006) includes method-
ology for checking the second level of a hierarchical
model based on a factorization of the full informa-
tion. We discuss this in Section 3 and show that this
methodology is also applicable when the first level
is improper.
While we agree with the necessity to consider im-
proper priors as part of a general theory of statis-
tics, it is difficult for us to accept these as a basis
from which statistical theory is built. It is our opin-
ion that the core of statistics is represented by the
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proper prior context. As such, we feel that what is
done outside of this core should be highly influenced,
if not directed, by the central theory with proper
priors. So our discussion reflects this and considers
the implications for the situation discussed in this
paper.
For us checking the sampling model and the prior
are important parts of a statistical analysis. A com-
mon complaint concerning the prior is that it is sub-
jective, as it represents someone’s personal beliefs
about the true value of θ. A common retort is that
the sampling model is also subjective as it represents
someone’s belief that the true distribution is in this
class, that is, it was someone’s subjective choice. Of
course, both these statements are correct as there is
typically little “objective” about either choice. From
another point of view, the fact that these choices are
subjective is a good thing because they are (hope-
fully) informed choices and that should lead to bet-
ter statistical analyses than if we made these choices
arbitrarily, or based on convention. For us the way to
reconcile the debate between objective and subjec-
tive is through checking that these ingredients make
sense in light of what we know to be truly objective
(at least if it is collected correctly), namely, the data.
Others argue that no such checks should be made,
as they lead us to be incoherent. There is a wide di-
versity of opinion on these matters and we certainly
acknowledge value in various points of view.
2. FACTORING THE FULL INFORMATION
Suppose we have prescribed a sampling model
{Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, a proper prior Π, and have observed
the data x. The sampling model and prior com-
bine to give the joint model Pθ × Π for (x, θ). We
will suppose that this joint model and the observed
data comprise the full information available to the
analyst. We are not saying that further information
may not be available in an analysis, but we will re-
strict our discussion to the situation where this is all
we have. Further, denote the prior predictive mea-
sure by M(B) =
∫
ΘPθ(B)Π(dθ); for statistics T and
U ◦T on the sample space letMT (·|U ◦T ) denote the
conditional prior predictive distribution of T given
U ◦ T, and Π(·|x) denote the posterior of θ.
In Box’s approach to model checking, the observed
value of x is compared with M to see if there is
model failure, that is, we check to see if x is a sur-
prising value from M. There would appear to be an
illogicality involved in this, however, as we know,
at least in the subjective Bayesian context, that x
was not generated fromM. If our assertion was that
x was generated from M, perhaps as a random ef-
fects model, then it would make sense to check x
against M, as this is an assertion about the under-
lying data generating mechanism. It is clearly more
appropriate, in Bayesian context, however, to see if
x is not surprising for at least one of the distribu-
tions in {Pθ : θ ∈Θ}, that is, check x against what we
are asserting is the data generating mechanism—the
sampling model.
As discussed in Evans and Moshonov (2006), there
are two possibilities for failure in the Bayesian for-
mulation: the sampling model may fail by x be-
ing surprising for each distribution in the sampling
model or, if the sampling model does not fail, the
prior may conflict with the data by placing the bulk
of its mass on those distributions in the sampling
model for which the data is surprising. Note that it
only makes sense to talk about prior-data conflict if
the sampling model does not fail. Logically, checking
the sampling model precedes checking for prior-data
conflict.
How then should we check for prior-data conflict?
Intuitively this arises when the effective supports of
the likelihood and the prior do not overlap. As dis-
cussed in Evans and Moshonov (2006), however, the
clearest approach to measuring this conflict comes
from asking if the observed likelihood is a surprising
value from its prior predictive distribution. Given
that the likelihood map is minimal sufficient, this
is equivalent to asking if the observed value T (x)
of a minimal sufficient statistic T is surprising from
its marginal prior predictive MT . Further consider-
ation shows that T (x) can be surprising simply be-
cause some value U(T (x)) is surprising where U ◦T
is ancillary. When such ancillaries exist, this leads
to comparing T (x) to MT (·|U ◦ T ) where U ◦ T is a
maximal ancillary, as this conditioning removes the
maximal amount of ancillary variation. Ancillary
variation is clearly not relevant to assessing prior-
data conflict as it does not depend on the param-
eter. Further, there is nothing to prevent us from
using some function S(T ), and comparing its ob-
served value to the distribution MS(T )(·|U ◦ T ), to
check for prior-data conflict. Of course, S has to be
chosen sensibly if we are going to make a meaningful
check.
This approach leads to the following factorization
of the joint distribution:
Pθ ×Π
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(1)
= P (·|T )× PU◦T ×MT (·|U ◦ T )×Π(·|x),
where P (·|T ) is the conditional distribution of the
data given the minimal sufficient statistic T, and so
does not involve θ, and PU◦T is the marginal distri-
bution of PU◦T which is also free of θ. Each of the
components in (1) plays a separate role in a statisti-
cal analysis. P (·|T ) and PU◦T are available for check-
ing the sampling model, MT (·|U ◦T ) is available for
checking for prior-data conflict and Π(·|x) [which re-
ally only depends on the data through T (x)] is for
inference about θ.We see thatM = P (·|T )×PU◦T ×
MT (·|U ◦ T ), which explains how this is a modifica-
tion of Box’s approach and it shows how to check
for inadequacies in the prior as well as the sampling
model.
It is our claim that effectively (1) shows us how to
proceed to avoid double use of the information and,
as such, avoid double use of the data. Of course,
as mentioned in the paper, it may be difficult, with
complicated models, to determine P (·|T ) or PU◦T
in meaningful ways. Accordingly, it seems reason-
able to weaken this requirement in such contexts to
having this hold asymptotically in some sense. For
example, a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test is asymp-
totically ancillary.
In the context of an improper prior that leads to
a proper posterior, then (1) is still available but now
the factor MT (·|U ◦ T ) is not a probability measure
and so it is not clear how we would check for prior-
data conflict. As discussed in Evans and Moshonov
(2006, 2007), a partial characterization of a nonin-
formative prior is that it would never lead to ev-
idence of a prior-data conflict existing no matter
what data is obtained. Thus the choice of an im-
proper prior is an assertion that this choice avoids
such a conflict. Noninformative sequences of priors
are also discussed in Evans and Moshonov (2006,
2007) and these can provide a way to justify such
a statement for a particular improper prior. In any
case, the choice of an improper prior should not in
any way change the role of the remaining factors if
we follow the principle that the proper case is cen-
tral. Although we do not have a formal proof, it
would seem that the methods discussed in Bayarri
and Berger (2000) will satisfy this asymptotically.
Further, any p-values computed according to this
factorization will have the necessary uniform prop-
erties when assessed against the appropriate mea-
sures. For example, if p(t) =MT (h(T ) > h(t)) is a
p-value for checking for prior-data conflict with no
ancillary, then p(T ) will be uniformly distributed,
at least in the continuous case, when T ∼MT .
3. HIERARCHICAL MODELS
In Evans and Moshonov (2006, 2007) methods are
discussed for checking hierarchically specified priors
for θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ1 × Θ2, that is, we specify pri-
ors Π1 and Π2 so that Π(d(θ1, θ2)) = Π2(dθ2|θ1)×
Π1(dθ1). In such situations we would like to check
the individual components of the prior separately, as
this gives us more information about a prior-data
conflict when this occurs. For example, it may be
that Π1 conflicts but Π2 does not.
We distinguish two different situations. First, the
parameters θ1 and θ2 may both be part of the likeli-
hood function and second, only θ2 is part of the like-
lihood function. The second situation corresponds
to hierarchical models and θ1 is a hyperparame-
ter. Methods are presented in Evans and Moshonov
(2006, 2007) for both of these situations, but we only
discuss hierarchical models here.
With proper priors we have the prior Π∗2(dθ2) =∫
Θ1
Π2(dθ2|θ1)Π1(dθ1) for the model parameter and
the methods of Section 2, based on the minimal
statistic T for the model {Pθ2 : θ2 ∈ Ω2}, are avail-
able to check whether or not Π∗2 conflicts with the
data. While this check is available, Evans and
Moshonov (2006) develop a factorization that is ap-
propriate for checking the components, such as the
second level Π2(·|θ1), of a hierarchical model.
To simplify the presentation of this, we will sup-
pose there are no relevant ancillaries for {Pθ2 : θ2 ∈
Ω2} based on T, but note that these can be incor-
porated as well. We can formally generate another
model for x from the joint distribution, namely, via
Mθ1(dx) =
∫
Ω2
Pθ2(dx)Π2(dθ2|θ1)
= P (dx|T )(t)
∫
Ω2
PTθ2(dt)Π2(dθ2|θ1)
= P (dx|T )(t)×MTθ1(dt).
This model is only formal, as, indeed, our model in-
dicates that x was not generated via Mθ1 , for some
value of θ1. Here Mθ1 is the conditional prior pre-
dictive distribution for x given θ1 and MTθ1 is the
conditional prior predictive distribution for T given
θ1. Note that when Π2(·|θ1) is proper, as in the pa-
per, then Mθ1 and MTθ1 are also proper.
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Let V (T ) be a minimal sufficient statistic for the
formal model for T given by {MTθ1 : θ1 ∈ Ω1}. We
can factorMTθ1 asMT (·|V )×MV θ1 , whereMT (·|V )
is the conditional prior predictive distribution of T
given V, andMV θ1 is the conditional prior predictive
distribution of V given θ1. Then the joint distribu-
tion of (θ1, x) can be factored as
P (·|T )×MT (·|V )×MV ×Π1(·|V ),(2)
where MV is the prior predictive distribution of V
and Π1(·|V ) is the posterior distribution of θ1.
Consider how each of the factors in (2) is to be
used. First P (·|T ) is available for checking the ba-
sic sampling model {Pθ2 : θ2 ∈ Ω2}. If no evidence
is found against {Pθ2 : θ2 ∈ Ω2}, we can proceed to
check the formal model {MTθ1 : θ1 ∈Ω1} for T using
MT (·|V ) and note that this does not depend on Π1.
Note also that MT (·|V ) is proper whenever Π2(·|θ1)
is proper for each value of θ1. If evidence is found
against this model, then, because we have accepted
the sampling model, and so consequently the model
{PTθ2 : θ2 ∈Ω2} for T, this must occur because of a
conflict between the observed value T (x) and Π2. So
a check of the formal model {MTθ1 : θ1 ∈ Ω1} using
MT (·|V ) is a check for prior-data conflict with Π2.
Note that this check proceeds exactly as in the sim-
pler situation described in Section 2. If we find no
evidence against {MTθ1 : θ1 ∈Ω1}, then we can check
for a conflict with Π1 using MV . Finally, if there is
no conflict with Π1, then Π1(·|V ) is available for in-
ference about θ1. Of course, if there is no conflict
with Π1 and Π2, then we can also make inference
about the parameter of interest θ2.
The model {MV θ1 : θ1 ∈Ω1} may have ancillaries.
Let W ◦ V be such a maximal ancillary. We then
have that MV factors as MV =MW◦V ×MV (·|W ◦
V ) so that (2) becomes
P (·|T )×MT (·|V )
(3)
×MW◦V ×MV (·|W ◦ V )×Π1(·|V ).
In this case, given that we have accepted the sam-
pling model, the factor MW◦V is available for check-
ing for prior-data conflict with Π2, andMV (·|W ◦V )
is the appropriate factor for checking Π1. The jus-
tification for this is exactly as in the simple case
discussed in Section 2.
Note that in (3), the only distribution that will
necessarily be improper when Π1 is improper, is
MV (·|W ◦ V ). The measure MV (·|W ◦ V ) is to be
used only in the check for Π1. Therefore, the choice
of an improper Π1 is really an assertion that this
prior will never conflict with the data. Irrespective of
whether or not Π1 is improper, the factors MT (·|V )
andMW◦V are available to check for prior-data con-
flict with Π2, when it is proper.
We consider the implementation of this approach
in the normal-normal hierarchical model presented
in the paper.
Example (Normal–normal hierarchical model).
We first consider a simpler model. In particular, we
assume that the known σ2i are all equal to σ
2 and
that we have balance, namely, n1 = · · · = nI = n.
For this problem we have that T (x) = (x¯1, . . . , x¯I)
′ ∼
NI(θ, (σ
2/n)I) and here θ is the model parameter
(corresponding to θ2 in our parameterization of a
hierarchical model above). Therefore, according to
our factorization, we check the sampling model us-
ing P (·|T ), which is effectively the distribution of
the residuals.
Now
(x¯1, . . . , x¯I)
′ = (θ1, . . . , θI)
′ + (σ/
√
n)(z1, . . . , zI)
′
where the zi are i.i.d. N(0,1) and, from the sec-
ond level, (θ1, . . . , θI)
′ ∼ NI(µ1, τ2I), independent
of (z1, . . . , zI)
′. Thus (µ, τ2) is the hyperparameter
(corresponding to θ1 in our parameterization of a hi-
erarchical model above). This implies that MT (µ,τ2)
is given by (x¯1, . . . , x¯I)
′ ∼ NI(µ1, (τ2 + σ2/n)I). It
is then easy to see that V (x¯1, . . . , x¯I) = (
∑I
i=1 x¯i,∑I
i=1 x¯
2
i ) is a minimal sufficient statistic for the model
{MT (µ,τ2) :µ ∈ R1, τ2 > 0}. Note also that V is a
complete minimal sufficient statistic so there are no
relevant ancillaries W that we need consider for the
check for the second level.
To determine MT (·|V ) we need the conditional
distribution of (x¯1, . . . , x¯I)
′ given (
∑I
i=1 x¯i,
∑I
i=1 x¯
2
i ).
This is clearly uniform on the sphere of squared ra-
dius
∑I
i=1 x¯
2
i lying in the hyperplane of R
I given
by {(y1, . . . , yI)′ :
∑I
i=1 yi =
∑I
i=1 x¯i}. We can simu-
late from this distribution by generating v1, . . . , vI−1
i.i.d. N(0,1), putting ui = vi/(
∑I−1
i=1 v
2
i )
1/2 and
(y1, . . . , yI)
′ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯I)
′ +A(u1, . . . , uI−1)
′
whereA ∈RI×(I−1) is such that the matrix (1/√I A)
is orthogonal. Then for any particular discrepancy
statistic, we can compute an appropriate p-value via
simulation.
The above analysis also applies when the σ2i /ni
are all equal. When they are not equal the analysis
is more complicated, as the form of V depends on
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which ones are equal. Further, it is not a complete
minimal sufficient statistic and so there are relevant
ancillaries.
Based on the factorization (3) we feel thatMT (·|V )
and MW◦V are appropriate distributions for com-
puting p-values to assess the second level for a hier-
archical model. Further, the uniformity of the corre-
sponding p-values should be assessed against these
distributions and this does not require that Π1 be
improper.
It is difficult to compare our approach with the
proposal in the paper, but we note that it has the
distinct advantage of not involving the prior for the
first level. For our check on the second level we need
say nothing about the prior for the first level and
it can be improper. The intuition for this lies with
conditioning on V, which completely removes the
effect of Π1 on the prior predictive for T , and the
fact that Π2 induces the ancillary W ◦ V. Therefore
any conflict that is found can only be due to Π2.
It may be that the method proposed in the paper
will satisfy (3) in an asymptotic sense but we do not
have a proof of this.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is sometimes suggested that model checking is
a somewhat informal process. Partly this is because
models can fail in many ways and some of these may
be more relevant in certain situations than others. It
seems impossible then to come up with a method-
ology that will check for all of the possibilities si-
multaneously. So it seems reasonable to ask that we
specify a set of checks that we think are relevant,
prior to seeing the data, and then implement only
these, rather than going on a hunting expedition for
defects. A similar approach seems appropriate for
checking for prior-data conflict.
While selection of the actual checks is perhaps
somewhat informal, we do not believe that there is
complete freedom in this. Some general principles
must apply. The ill effects of double use of the data,
as discussed in this paper and Bayarri and Berger
(2000), provide a good example of the need for such
principles.
In frequentist statistical theory, inference about
parameters depends on the data only through the
minimal sufficient statistic and, what is left over in
the data (the residual), is available for model check-
ing. Mixing these up would seem to correspond to
an inappropriate statistical analysis. We believe this
is equally applicable in Bayesian formulations.
Checking for prior-data conflict seems to sit be-
tween model checking and inference. While it de-
pends on the minimal sufficient statistic, however,
the factorization given by (1) indicates that it re-
ally is separate from model checking and inference
as it involves a separate component of the full in-
formation as expressed by the joint distribution. In
essence (1) prescribes how each component of the
full information is to be used in a statistical analy-
sis. If we mix these up, it would seem to us that we
can expect illogical or incoherent behavior, for ex-
ample, overly conservative p-values. Note that in a
certain sense each component of (1) is independent
of the others, as we could prescribe each probabil-
ity measure separately and still end up with a valid
joint distribution. Specification of each component
of (1) is necessary and sufficient for the specification
of a joint probability distribution for (x, θ).
Of course, this restriction could be weakened to re-
quiring that a methodology only satisfy (1) in some
asymptotic sense. The motivation for this would seem
to arise from the complexity of some situations. Still,
(1) can be implemented exactly with many models
of considerable importance, so it is not just of theo-
retical relevance.
Similarly, we believe that (3) is the relevant fac-
torization for model checking and checking for prior-
data conflict in hierarchical models. From that per-
spective it would be important to see if the methods
proposed in the paper satisfied this in some asymp-
totic sense. This would give us more confidence that
these constituted an appropriate way to proceed in
situations where they were felt to be necessary.
We also feel that our discussion of (3) shows that
the choice of prior Π1 for θ1 is irrelevant for checking
Π2 with hierarchical models. In particular, whether
Π1 is proper or improper, the check for Π2 is the
same and this is a satisfying result. This does not
appear to be the case for the method proposed in the
paper which depends, in particular, on which objec-
tive prior we use. Perhaps this effect disappears as
the amount of data increases, but then the relevance
of checking for prior-data conflict disappears too, as
the effect of the prior on inference disappears, at
least under reasonable regularity conditions.
Overall, our purpose here is to suggest that there
is a principled approach to the question addressed
in the paper. We are not saying that using the par-
tial posterior approach is in some way incorrect. We
do think, however, that it would be worth investi-
gating to what extent the partial posterior approach
satisfied (3).
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